

## Message Text

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ACTION SP-02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-10 EUR-12 NEA-10  
AID-05 IGA-02 EB-08 TRSE-00 OMB-01 L-03 CIAE-00  
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CEA-01 /120 W  
-----124120 211256Z /50

R 211059Z AUG 77  
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4160  
INFO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY LAGOS  
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TEHRAN 7426

USOECD

FOR S/P TONY LAKE

E.O.11652: GDS  
TAGS: EGEN, ECIN  
SUBJ: NORTH-SOUTH STRATEGIES

REF: STATE 191928

1. I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO  
THE INTERAGENCY STUDY YOU ARE STIMULATING ON THE BROAD  
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RANGE OF NORTH-SOUTH STRATEGIES. IT IS INDEED REASSURING  
TO LEARN THAT THIS OVERDUE EFFORT IS BEING MOUNTED AND  
THAT YOU ARE COORDINATING IT.

2. IN 1976, I WROTE A CABLE FROM MANILA GIVING CERTAIN GENERAL  
VIEWSON THIS SUBJECT. A REVISED VERSION OF THAT CABLE WAS  
LATER PUBLISHED BY THE OPEN FORUM. I WILL NOT REITERATE IN

THIS CABLE ALL THE POINTS I MADE AT THAT TIME, BUT I COMMEND  
THE CABLE TO YOUR ATTENTION.

3. ESSENTIALLY, I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD WORLD WERE MIND-BOGGLING TO THE U.S. PUBLIC, AND WE RISKED THE DANGER OF LOSING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS UNLESS WE BROKE THEM INTO TRACTABLE PARTS. I ALSO SUGGESTED THAT OUR PROGRAMS SHOULD BE FULLY COORDINATED WITH OTHER OECD NATIONS SO THAT OUR CONGRESS AND PUBLIC WOULD FEEL THAT OTHER AFFLUENT STATES WERE DOING THEIR SHARE.

4. I PROPOSED BREAKING OUR APPROACH INTO THREE SECTORS:

- A. THE OIL-RICH LDC'S;
- B. THE NATIONS WHICH LACKED BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE, LITERACY, AND WHICH HAD FUNDAMENTAL HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF STARVATION AND DISEASE;
- C. THE "POTENTIAL ACHIEVERS," WHICH HAD MARKET ECONOMIES AND, GIVEN THEIR OWN INSTINCTS, WOULD HOPE TO JOIN THE "FIRST WORLD" OF THE OECD STATES.

IN SETTING FORTH THIS GENERAL PROPOSITION, HOWEVER, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT SOME COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN AND VENEZUELA FALL INTO BOTH CATEGORY A AND C AND OUR STRATEGIES SHOULD TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

5. IN GENERAL, I EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT GROUP A OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TAKE CARE OF ITSELF, PROVIDED WE AVOID CONFLICT AND  
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CONFRONTATION WITH OPEC. THE NEW CARTER ADMINISTRATION ENERGY POLICY IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HOWEVER, WE AND OECD MUST TAKE OTHER STEPS TO ASSURE THAT THE POST-PETROLEUM ECONOMIES OF THESE COUNTRIES ARE INTEGRATED INTO OUR TRADE AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS.

6. GROUP B PRESENTS THE MOST FRUSTRATING CHALLENGE; BUT, IN GENERAL, INVOLVES LESS STRATEGIC CONCERN TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS. OUR ASSISTANCE TOWARD THIS GROUP SHOULD TAKE TWO FORMS AND BE ADDRESSED TO TWO SEPARABLE OBJECTIVES WHICH MAY OVER TIME CONVERGE AND BECOME MUTUALLY REINFORCING. OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE GREATEST NUMBER OF THE POOR IN THE POOREST NATIONS. ESSENTIALLY A WELFARE PROGRAM. IT SEEMS NATURAL THAT THIS KIND OF PROGRAM SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED VERY LARGE THROUGH INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IT WOULD BE THE AREA IN WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ENGAGE THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ACTING IN THE NAME OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERN. THERE WOULD PREDICTABLY BE NO EASY SUCCESSES IN THIS FIELD, BUT COLLABORATION WITH COMMUNIST EFFORTS ON A NON-IDEOLOGICAL BASIS MIGHT BRING THE USSR, IN PARTICULAR, OUT OF ITS SHELL TO JOIN IN SUCH WORK.

7. OUR SECOND OBJECTIVE WOULD BE IN THE SO-CALLED "NATION BUILDING" CATEGORY. IF THESE POOREST OF THE POOR ARE EVER TO HOPE TO GET OFF THE INTERNATIONAL WELFARE DOLE THEY MUST BE GIVEN SOME MEANS OF STARTING TOWARD SELF-SUSTAINED ECONOMIC VIABILITY. THIS PROBABLY MEANS CAPITAL PROJECTS AND INFRA-STRUCTURE IN THE CONTENT OF A DEVELOPMENT SYRATEGY WHICH AIMS TO MAXIMIZE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES. EVEN HERE, HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT SOME COUNTRIES MAY BE SO LACKING IN HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES THAT THEY WILL REMAIN THE GHETTOS

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FOR S/P TONY LAKE

OF THE WORLD FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IN OTHER WORDS OUR ASSISTANCE IN "NATION BUILDING" SHOULD BE HIGHLY SELECTIVE ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND RESTRAINED WHEN FILTERED THROUGH MULTI-NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE INTERESTED IN

JOINING IN MULTINATIONAL EFFORTS OF THIS TYPE AND HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WOULD WELCOME THE COMMUNIST WORLD INTO SUCH A CLUB.

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8. FROM A NATIONAL SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, GROUP C IS PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING. THESE COUNTRIES ARE LARGELY IN LATIN AMERICA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND MAY HAVE ONE OR TWO REPRESENTATIVES IN AFRICA. WE SHOULD IDENTIFY AND ENUMERATE THESE STATES. THERE ARE PROBABLY LESS THAN 30 WITH A POPULATION LESS THAN 500 MILLION. THEY ARE TANGIBLE, TRACTABLE, EASILY GRASPED BY THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC; AND, WITH GOOD MANAGEMENT, OUGHT TO PRODUCE A SIZABLE NUMBER OF THE SUCCESS STORIES NEEDED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR OUR GLOBAL EFFORTS. THESE ARE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO RELATIVELY HIGH PER CAPITA INCOME AND DIVERSIFIED THEIR EXPORTS, WHICH ARE INCREASINGLY PENETRATING WORLD MARKETS. THEY NEED IMPROVED ACCESS TO THE MARKETS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES FOR THEIR MANUFACTURED EXPORTS; THEY NEED ACCESS TO PRIVATE CAPITAL MARKETS AND THEY CONTINUE TO NEED LOANS FROM THE WORLD BANK AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS ON MARKET-RELATED TERMS. THEY SHOULD BE HANDLED IN CONJUNCTION WITH OECD OR, IF NECESSARY, BILATERALLY FOR THESE MATTERS AS WELL AS FOR GUARANTEED INVESTMENT, TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND POPULATION CONTROL ASSISTANCE.

9. REFTEL ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE TEHRAN "AREA." THIS COULD INVOLVE WEST ASIA, OR THE MIDDLE EAST, OR BOTH. SINCE TEHRAN SEEMS THE ONLY ADDRESSEE IN BOTH REGIONS, I WILL RELATE MY ANSWER TO BOTH, ALTHOUGH THE OBSERVATIONS WILL OBVIOUSLY DIFFER CONSIDERABLY AS BETWEEN, FOR EXAMPLE, SAUDI ARABIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

10. IRAN AND THE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS, NOTABLY SAUDI ARABIA, ARE ALREADY MAKING SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH THE OPEC DEVELOPMENT FUND, TO VARIOUS LDC ECONOMIES. ALTHOUGH IRAN IS RATHER ECUMENICAL WITH ITS LARGESSE, THE ARABS DIRECT MOST OF THEIR AID TO ISLAMIC COUNTRIES. A SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO BLEND

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THIS ASSISTNANCE INTO MULTINATIONAL CHANNELS PRESCRIBED FOR GROUP B HAS ALREADY BEEN LAUNCHED VIA IFAD. OTHER SIMILARLY STRUCTURED AND FOCUSED EFFORTS MIGHT BE MADE, ALTHOUGH OPEC WILL DOUBTLESS WISH TO PRESERVE SOME OF ITS ELEEMOSYNARY IDENTITY. OPEC CONTRIBUTION TO EFFORTS ORCHESTRATED BY THE UNITED NATIONS COULD BE USED TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO

MAKE A SIMILAR CONTRIBUTION.

11. AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND THE NATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA WOULD PROBABLY ALL QUALIFY AS RECIPIENTS OF ASSISTANCE UNDER GROUP B. IF WELFARE PROGRAMS TO ALL THESE NATIONS COULD BE INTERNATIONALIZED AND THUS BE REMOVED FROM SUPERPOWER CONTENTION, I BELIEVE THE OPEC GROUP, AS A WHOLE, WOULD WELCOME THIS DEVELOPMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, IMPERSONAL AND ANONYMOUS ADVICE FROM AGENCIES SUCH AS THE IMF COULD PROBABLY INDUCE MORE AUSTERE AND EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN THOSE STATES THAN COULD BE ACHIEVED IN BILATERAL APPROACHES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO THE CHANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE POLITICS. IN PURSUING THIS COURSE WE WOULD HAVE TO FOREGO LINKAGE OF OUR AID TO PURCHASES IN THE U.S.

12. WHILE I DO NOT FULLY COMPREHEND THE THRUST OF THE STUDY ANTICIPATED FROM THE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 1, I PERSONALLY THINK IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE TO FOCUS OUR BILATERAL AID PROGRAMS ON FOOD, HEALTH AND EDUCATION NEEDS OF "THE WORLD'S PEOPLE." THIS IS THE WOOLY SORT OF PROGRAM THAT I DESCRIBE IN PARAGRAPH THREE AS "MIND-BOGLING." MOREOVER, IT IS PRECISELY THE SORT OF PROGRAM WHICH SHOULD BE AIMED AT THE GROUP B NATIONS AND SHOULD BE INTERNATIONALLY, RATHER THAN BILATERALLY, ADMINISTERED. THE U.S. COULD AND SHOULD MAKE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUCH A PROGRAM, BUT SHOULD AVOID HAVING IT IDENTIFIED AS A U.S. BILATERAL EFFORT. IT MIGHT MAKE SOME BUREAUCRATS FEEL MAGNANIMOUSLY CHARITABLE TO BE THE BILATERAL DISPENSERS OF AID TO THE WORLD'S NEEDIEST;

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R 211059Z AUG 77  
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USOECD

FOR S/P TONY LAKE

BUT IT MAKES MUCH MORE POLITICAL SENSE TO HAVE THAT CHARITY  
MODESTLY CONCEALED IN A MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. THIS IS PARTICULAR-  
ARLY SO BECAUSE THE EFFORT WILL PROBABLY ALWAYS PROVE INFERIOR TO  
THE DEMOGRAPHIC NEEDS.

13. THE OTHER PROBLEM WITH SUCH A BILATERAL APPROACH IS LINKED  
DIRECTLY WITH REFTEL'S STATEMENT THAT "SUCH A STRATEGY COULD  
THREATEN TRADITIONAL ELITES." THIS STRIKES ME AS A MOST NAIVE  
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STATEMENT. IF THE U.S. WISHES TO TAKE ON THE PROBLEMS OF FEEDING,  
NURSING AND TEACHING THE POOREST OF THE POOR, THE TRADITIONAL  
ELITES WOULD BE CYNICALLY HAPPY TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF ANY  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM AND CONCENTRATE EVEN MORE ZEALOUSLY ON  
LINING THEIR OWN POCKETS WITHOUT ANY REAL CONCERN FOR BETTER  
INCOME DISTRIBUTION. THEY WOULD PLAY THEIR USUAL GAME OF  
FENDING OFF U.S. IMPORTUNING FOR CHANGE BY THE TIME-HONORED  
THREATS TO "GO COMMUNIST" IF WE PRESSURE THEM. MOREOVER,  
ASSISTANCE TO THE POOR IS A TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE WEAPON FOR  
PRESSURE ON THE ELITES, BECAUSE WE CAN NEVER, IN GOOD  
CONSCIENCE, THREATEN TO CUT IT OFF. THUS, WE WOULD GET THE  
WORST OF BOTH WORLDS IF THIS IS TO BE THE CONTENT OF OUR  
BILATERAL PROGRAMS. SKINNLY, SOME OF THESE "TRADITIONAL  
ELITES" DESERVE TO DISAPPEAR FROM THE SCENE BOTH IN TERM  
OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST AND THAT OF THE POOR. WHERE A POLI-  
TICAL DYNAMIC IS AT WORK IN THIS DIRECTION, WE SHOULD PROBABLY  
ENCOURAGE IT, BUT SELECTIVELY.

14. AS FOR THE ATTITUDES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA TOWARDS  
U.S. EMBARKATION ON SUCH A PROGRAM, I ASSUME THEY WOULD SHRUG  
THEIR SHOULDERS AND WONDER WHY WE CONTINUE TO INSIST  
ON SUCH NATIONAL MASOCHISM. I DOUBT THAT IRAN  
AND THE ARABS WOULD MODIFY THEIR AID PROGRAMS TO MATCH  
OURS. WHILE I CANNOT RPT NOT SPEAK WITH MUCH AUTHORITY  
FOR THE RECIPIENT NATIONS, I ASSUME THEY WOULD BE QUITE  
CONTENT TO ACCEPT OUR LARGESSE, WHILE SPECIFYING IN

BOMBASTIC TERMS THAT THEY WILL RESIST ANY AMERICAN  
EFFORT TO ENCROACH ON THEIR SOVEREIGNTY BY "INTERFERING  
IN THEIR DOMESTIC PROCESSES."

15. IT WILL BE CLEAR FROM THE FOREGOING THAT I BELIEVE  
THE PROGRAMS ON BASIC HUMAN NEEDS OUGHT TO BE ADMINISTERED  
MULTILATERALLY RATHER THAN BILATERALLY. IN THIS CONTEXT,  
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I APPLAUD THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO ENGAGE THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN THE EFFORT. I THINK EVERYTHING IS TO BE GAINED BY PROPOSING "JOINT" DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IF THAT WORD MEANS A TRULY INTERNATIONAL EFFORT RATHER THAN A US-USSR OR OECD-COMECON APPROACH. ALL LDC'S IN MY EXPERIENCE (EXCEPT CHINA AND NORTH KOREA) WOULD BE INTERESTED IN "HOSTING" SUCH VENTURES. HOWEVER, I HAVE SEEN NO RPT NO INTEREST AMONG COMMUNIST OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATS FOR SUCH PROGRAMS, EXCEPT FOR THE ROMANIANS, WHO CONSTANTLY SAY THEY WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN EFFORT, BUT AS AN LDC RECIPIENT RATHER THAN AS A DONOR. SIMILARLY, I THINK THE VIETNAMESE (AND LAO) WOULD PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM. I FRANKLY SEE NO RPT NO DISADVANTAGES IN SUCH PROGRAMS IF THEY ARE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE GROUP B NATIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA 4.

16. IN SHORT, I FEEL THAT US POLICY TOWARDS THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE, CONCEIVED NOT ONLY WITH A SENSE OF CONCERN AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WORLD'S POOR, BUT ALSO WITH A CLEAR APPRECIATION OF OUR OWN NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTERESTS. WE MUST NOT RPT NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A PUBLIC CONSENSUS BEHIND OUR POLICY AND OUR PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE THE LEADERSHIP TO DEVELOP AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM FOR THE MOST SERIOUSLY Affected ELEMENTS OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION; BUT SHOULD DO IT WITHOUT THE PUFFERY THAT SEEKS ACCLAIM FOR OUR ROLE. WE SHOULD AT THE SAME TIME AVOID PROGRAMS OF EXCLUSIVELY US RESPONSIBILITY WHICH, IN EFFECT, REDUCE OUR LARGESSE TO THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR. THOSE US BILATERAL PROGRAMS (OR PREFERABLY OECD PROGRAMS) SHOULD AIM AT PULLING UP THE BOOTSTRAPS OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH WILL WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN US IN THE RANKS OF THE AFFLUENT. WE MUST AVOID THE FABIAN TENDENCY TO IGNORE THEM AND CONCENTRATE ON THE MORE NEEDY, THEREBY CONDEMNING THEM TO CONSTANT FRUSTRATION BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS BEING  
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AIMED AT THEIR LESS FAVORED BRETHREN.

17. I WOULD WELCOME FURTHER INTERCHANGES WITH YOU AS  
YOUR WORK DEVELOPS. IN PARTICULAR, I WOULD LIKE TO  
LEARN OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH EMERGE SEPTEMBER 1  
FROM THE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE. YOUR  
ADUMBRATION OF ITS CONCLUSIONS IS DISTURBING.  
SULLIVAN

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